THE ROLE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON IN THE EXERCISE OF SOUND CRITICISM

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show the conceptual relationship between the logical philosophical principle of Sufficient Reason and the legal concept of Sound Criticism. For this purpose, in the first instance the reader will be able to find a section where the concept of logic, its constituent elements and its contemporary definition will be addressed; Subsequently, the text will deal with the notion of logic as an adequate tool in the exercise of motivation of sentences by the judicial operator; then, you can find a brief definition and explanation of the most used logical-philosophical principles, namely, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of identity, the principle of excluded middle. Next, the text will offer a chapter on the historicity of the principle of sufficient reason, where a tracing of classical, pre-Aristotelian notions will be carried out, until reaching the definitions offered in modernity by Leibniz and Schopenhauer. Finally, the reader will be able to find a trace of the notion of Sound Criticism from the 19th century to the current General Code of the Colombian Process. Finally, the relationship between the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the legal notion of Sound Criticism will be shown by means of what is dated in the sentence T-458 of 2007 of the Constitutional Court.